In Module VI, we zoom in on the stakeholder terrain that makes heritage–security problems hard to govern in practice. We learned how to model the heritage–human security nexus and how contestation and negotiation emerge around it. Now we add the question that determines whether any solution can actually hold over time: who gets to shape decisions, through what institutions, and with what legitimacy.
This module gives you two complementary toolkits. First, we introduce stakeholder mapping as a disciplined method, not a “list of interested parties,” but an analytic way to identify who has power, who has legitimacy, who has urgency, and who bears the largest human-security impacts despite limited voice. That distinction matters because many heritage conflicts persist not because the technical solution is unknown, but because the stakeholder field is uneven and the costs of change are asymmetric.
Second, we introduce collaborative governance: when and how public authorities can convene multi-stakeholder processes that are more than consultation and more than public relations. We will focus on what makes collaboration succeed or fail, starting conditions (trust, incentives, asymmetries), the design of the forum and rules, facilitative leadership, and the importance of “small wins” that build commitment and shared understanding.
We ground Week 1 in the Piraeus waterfront case—COSCO, the port-city, and the surrounding municipalities—because it shows, in a concrete European setting, how strategic infrastructure, regulation, local livelihoods, and identity politics collide. Week 2 then shifts from analysis to craft: you will build your own stakeholder map and use it to propose a realistic engagement strategy that keeps human security outcomes in view.
| Reading: Ansell, Chris; Gash, Alison. Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice Ansell and Gash argue that “collaborative governance” has emerged as a distinct, increasingly common mode of governing. It's a response to the limitations of adversarial interest-group politics and technocratic/managerialist implementation, in which public agencies convene non-state stakeholders in a formal, deliberative, consensus-oriented decision-making forum to make or implement public policy or manage public assets. Their core contribution is a contingency model derived from a meta-analysis of 137 cases, which says collaboration’s success depends on identifiable starting conditions (e.g., prior conflict/cooperation, incentives, power/resource imbalances), institutional design, and facilitative leadership, plus what happens inside the process (face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment, shared understanding). They emphasize that effective collaborations often develop through a “virtuous cycle” driven by “small wins” that deepen trust and commitment and expand shared understanding over time. | ||
| Reading: Bryson, John M. What to do when stakeholders matter Bryson’s core claim is practical: in public and nonprofit settings, policies and programs succeed or fail largely on whether key stakeholders are identified, understood, and (at least minimally) satisfied on their own criteria, because stakeholders can confer or withdraw the political support, legitimacy, resources, and implementation capacity that “makes things real.” His main argument is that stakeholder analysis is a comparatively “cheap” and under-used form of strategic intelligence that helps actors frame solvable problems—technically feasible and politically acceptable—especially in shared-power, “no one fully in charge” environments. He then offers a structured menu of stakeholder identification/analysis techniques mapped to the stages of a policy/strategy change cycle, along with guidance on who should be involved and when. | ||
| Reading: Papadopoulos, Alex G. Port City as Strategic Frontier COSCO, Sovereignty, and the Remaking of Piraeus In this conference paper, I argue that the COSCO Shipping transformation of the Port of Piraeus should be read as more than an infrastructure modernization story. It is a strategic frontier case in which external capital, EU/NATO commitments, and Greek regulatory authority intersect, and where the real effects are distributed unevenly across stakeholders, including in communities along the waterfront. I trace how a sequence of legal–institutional steps culminated in the 2023 Presidential Decree that effectively embeds COSCO’s master plan into Greek planning law, raising questions about “graduated sovereignty” and the subordination of heritage protection to development speed. I then introduce a three-dimensional stakeholder model (planning speed, relative power, structural dependency) to show why negotiation is often structurally imbalanced—especially for municipalities and residents who bear environmental, social, and access costs while possessing limited leverage. | ||
| Lecture: MODULE 6a_Stakeholder mapping and collaborative governance in a heritage-human security context | ||
| Lecture: MODULE 6b_Applying stakeholder models to the Port of Piraeus case - Closing comments | ||
| PPT/Module 6a: Stakeholders, stakeholder mapping & collaborative governance in European heritage context Lecture visualizations | ||
| PPT/Module 6b_Applying stakeholder paradigms to the Port of Puraeus case - Closing remarks | ||
| TERM PAPER PRESENTATION - Template |
