


[Διαχείριση και Ανάδειξη Πολιτιστικής Πληροφορίας]: Δίκαιο και Δεοντολογία Πολιτιστικής Πληροφορίας (Υ)




[Διαχείριση Ψηφιακής Πληροφορίας - Υπηρεσίες Πληροφόρησης]: Δίκαιο Πληροφορίας (Ε)

Γιώργος Μπουχάγιαρ
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Ιόνιο Πανεπιστήμιο
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CYBER & DATA SECURITY LAB

# Προτάσεις για παρουσιάσεις

vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_ddf_doc_20250128_antiqua-et-nova_en.html

[DE - EN - ES - FR - IT]

DICASTERY FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH
DICASTERY FOR CULTURE AND EDUCATION

# ANTIQUA ET NOVA

## *Note* on the Relationship Between Artificial Intelligence and Human Intelligence

### I. Introduction

1. With wisdom both ancient and new (cf. Mt. 13:52), we are called to reflect on the current challenges and opportunities posed by scientific and technological advancements, particularly by the recent development of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The Christian tradition regards the gift of intelligence as an essential aspect of how humans are created "in the image of God" (Gen. 1:27). Starting from an integral vision of the human person and the biblical calling to "till" and "keep" the earth (Gen. 2:15), the Church emphasizes that this gift of intelligence should be expressed through the responsible use of reason and technical abilities in the stewardship of the created world.

2. The Church encourages the advancement of science, technology, the arts, and other forms of human endeavor, viewing them as part of the "collaboration of man and woman with God in perfecting the visible creation."[1] As Sirach affirms, God "gave skill to human beings, that he might be glorified in his marvelous works" (Sir. 38:6). Human abilities and creativity come from God and, when used rightly, glorify God by reflecting his wisdom and goodness. In light of this, when we ask ourselves what it means to "be human," we cannot exclude a consideration of our scientific and technological abilities.

3. It is within this perspective that the present *Note* addresses the anthropological and ethical challenges raised by AI—issues that are particularly significant, as one of the goals of this technology is *to imitate the human intelligence that designed it.* For instance, unlike many other human creations, AI can be trained on the results of human creativity and then generate new "artifacts" with a level of speed and skill that often rivals or surpasses what humans can do, such as producing text or images indistinguishable from human compositions. This raises critical concerns about AI's potential role in the growing crisis of truth in the public forum. Moreover, this technology is designed to learn and make certain choices autonomously, adapting to new situations and providing solutions not foreseen by its programmers, and thus, it raises fundamental questions about ethical responsibility and human safety, with broader implications for society as a whole. This new situation has prompted many people to reflect on what it means to be human and the role of humanity in the world

# China's Approach to AI Anthropomorphism

China's proposed AI law acknowledges AI-related human vulnerabilities and establishes contextual technical measures to prevent AI harms | Edition #264

LUIZA JAROVSKY, PHD
JAN 13, 2026



https://www.luizasnewsletter.com/p/chinas-approach-to-ai-anthropomorphism

dig.watch/updates/china-ai-science-technology-ethics-review

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13 Apr 2026

# China sets trial ethics rules for AI science and technology activities

*New trial rules in China set out ethics review procedures for AI science and technology activities.*



https://dig.watch/updates/china-ai-science-technology-ethics-review

Local authorities and relevant departments may also establish specialised ethics review and service centres that provide review, re-examination, training, and consulting services on commission, but may not both review and re-examine the same AI activity.

The text sets out application and review procedures, including general, simplified, expert re-examination, and emergency procedures. It says review should focus on human well-being, fairness and justice, controllability and trustworthiness, transparency and explainability, traceability of responsibility, and privacy protection. Review decisions are to be made within 30 days after acceptance, subject to extension in complex cases. An emergency review is generally completed within 72 hours.

The measures also provide for expert re-examination of listed activities. The attached list covers human-machine integrated systems with a strong influence on human behaviour, psychological emotions, or health; algorithmic models, applications, and systems with the capacity for social mobilisation or guidance of social consciousness; and highly autonomous automated decision systems used in scenarios involving safety or health risks. The text says the list will be adjusted dynamically as needed.

The document further states that violations may be investigated and handled under laws, including the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, the Personal Information Protection Law, and the Science and Technology Progress Law. According to the text, the measures take effect upon issuance.




https://rm.coe.int/steering-committee-for-human-rights-cddh-cddh-handbook-on-human-rights/48802a2f59




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techcrunch.com/2026/04/09/florida-ag-investigation-openai-chatgpt-shooting/

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


IMAGE CREDITS: OLIVIER MORIN/AFP / GETTY IMAGES

AI

# Florida AG announces investigation into OpenAI over shooting that allegedly involved ChatGPT

Lucas Ropek — 1:11 PM PDT · April 9, 2026

Florida's attorney general, James Uthmeier, announced Thursday that his office planned to investigate OpenAI over the alleged role of ChatGPT in a deadly shooting last year.



https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/09/florida-ag-investigation-openai-chatgpt-shooting/

technologyreview.com/2026/04/16/1136029/humans-in-the-loop-ai-war-illusion/?utm_source=LinkedIn&utm_campaign=site_visitor.unpaid.engagement&utm_medium=tr_social

OPINION

# Why having “humans in the loop” in an AI war is an illusion

We don't really understand AI's inner workings, so we're effectively flying blind.

By Uri Maoz

April 16, 2026

https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/04/16/1136029/humans-in-the-loop-ai-war-illusion/?utm_source=LinkedIn&utm_campaign=site_visitor.unpaid.engagement&utm_medium=tr_social

support.claude.com/en/articles/14328960-identity-verification-on-claude

Claude Support

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# Identity verification on Claude

Updated this week

Being responsible with powerful technology starts with knowing who is using it. Identity verification helps us prevent abuse, enforce our usage policies, and comply with legal obligations.

We are rolling out identity verification for a few use cases, and you might see a verification prompt when accessing certain capabilities, as part of our routine platform integrity checks, or other safety and compliance measures.

We only use your verification data to confirm who you are and not for any other purposes.

## How are we verifying?

We selected Persona Identities as our verification partner based on the strength of their technology, privacy controls, and security safeguards. Follow the steps below to complete your identity verification process.

reddit.com/r/ClaudeCode/comments/1smlv74/anthropic_just_quietly_launched_id_verification/

r/ClaudeCode ✕ Search in r/ClaudeCode

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r/ClaudeCode • 1d ago
Direct-Attention8597

# Anthropic just quietly launched ID verification for Claude, and the timing couldn't be more ironic

Anthropic rolled out government ID verification for Claude this week via a third-party service called Persona Identities. You may be asked to upload a physical government-issued photo ID (passport, driver's license, or national ID) plus a live selfie depending on the features you use.

Here's the official reasoning from Anthropic's help center: prevent abuse, enforce usage policies, and fulfill legal obligations. They also say the data won't be used for training, marketing, or advertising, only for identity confirmation.

**Why this is raising eyebrows:**

A few months ago, millions of users migrated from ChatGPT to Claude specifically because Anthropic declined a Pentagon contract over concerns about mass surveillance and autonomous weapons. The privacy-focused positioning was a big part of Claude's appeal. Now those same users are being asked to hand over biometric data and government IDs.

**Some context that makes this more uncomfortable:**

Persona, the verification partner Anthropic selected, had a documented data breach in late 2025 that exposed around 70,000 government ID images from Discord users. Separate investigations have also found that Persona may share user data with up to 17 sub-processors.

**What Anthropic says about data handling:**

Verification data stays between you, Persona, and Anthropic. It won't be shared with third parties for marketing or unrelated purposes. Anthropic is the "data controller," meaning they set the rules for how it's used and retained.

**The rollout:**

It's not hitting everyone at once. Right now it's being triggered for select use cases and certain users, with broader rollout coming gradually.

This is the first major AI chatbot to require this level of identity verification. No word yet on whether this will become a requirement for basic access or stay limited to specific features.




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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijeMM-NXvus




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https://www.ertflix.gr/#/details/ERT_PS054878_E0


https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/trump-justice-department-firing-squads-lethal-injection-executions-rcna341897




https://katalog-barbaraiweins.com/

kindredsquared.org.uk/school-readiness-survey/

Kindred²:

dred²

About us | School Readiness Survey | Little Sparks Big Starts | Projects | News, Views and Digest | Contact

# School Readiness Survey

For the past six years, Kindred² has surveyed thousands of teachers and parents to source robust evidence of the proportion of children that are considered 'school ready', comparing this to perceptions of parents.

We use this school readiness evidence to highlight the impact on children and schools when pupils arrive in Reception having not met their developmental milestones and the difficulties that children, families and schools face from this.

## − 2025 School Readiness Survey

Our sixth annual school readiness report once again sets out perceptions of the scale and impact of children missing their early developmental milestones. The survey finds that the number of children who are 'school ready' has declined significantly since 2024.

https://kindredsquared.org.uk/school-readiness-survey/

# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

## GDPR

## AI Act

# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

**GDPR**

↓

**DPIA**

**(Data Protection Impact Assessment)**

**AI Act**

↓

**FRIA**

**(Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment)**

# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

## GDPR

↓

## DPIA

### (Data Protection Impact Assessment)

*Άρθρο 35*

**Εκτίμηση αντικτύπου σχετικά με την προστασία δεδομένων**

1. Όταν ένα είδος επεξεργασίας, ιδίως με χρήση νέων τεχνολογιών και συνεκτιμώντας τη φύση, το πεδίο εφαρμογής, το πλαίσιο και τους σκοπούς της επεξεργασίας, ενδέχεται να επιφέρει υψηλό κίνδυνο για τα δικαιώματα και τις ελευθερίες των φυσικών προσώπων, ο υπεύθυνος επεξεργασίας διενεργεί, πριν από την επεξεργασία, εκτίμηση των επιπτώσεων των σχεδιαζόμενων πράξεων επεξεργασίας στην προστασία δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα. Σε μία εκτίμηση μπορεί να εξετάζεται ένα σύνολο παρόμοιων πράξεων επεξεργασίας οι οποίες ενέχουν παρόμοιους υψηλούς κινδύνους.

2. Ο υπεύθυνος επεξεργασίας ζητεί τη γνώμη του υπευθύνου προστασίας δεδομένων, εφόσον έχει οριστεί, κατά τη διενέργεια εκτίμησης αντικτύπου σχετικά με την προστασία δεδομένων.

3. Η αναφερόμενη στην παράγραφο 1 εκτίμηση αντικτύπου σχετικά με την προστασία δεδομένων απαιτείται ιδίως στην περίπτωση:

α) συστηματικής και εκτενούς αξιολόγησης προσωπικών πτυχών σχετικά με φυσικά πρόσωπα, η οποία βασίζεται σε αυτοματοποιημένη επεξεργασία, περιλαμβανομένης της κατάρτισης προφίλ, και στην οποία βασίζονται αποφάσεις που παράγουν έννομα αποτελέσματα σχετικά με το φυσικό πρόσωπο ή ομοίως επηρεάζουν σημαντικά το φυσικό πρόσωπο,

β) μεγάλης κλίμακας επεξεργασίας των ειδικών κατηγοριών δεδομένων που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 9 παράγραφος 1 ή δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα που αφορούν ποινικές καταδίκες και αδικήματα που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 10 ή

γ) συστηματικής παρακολούθησης δημοσίως προσβάσιμου χώρου σε μεγάλη κλίμακα.

## AI Act

↓

## FRIA

### (Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment)

*Άρθρο 27*

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1. Πριν από την ανάπτυξη συστήματος ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου που αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 6 παράγραφος 2, με την εξαίρεση συστημάτων ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου που προορίζονται για χρήση στον τομέα που αναφέρεται στο παράρτημα ΙΙΙ σημείο 2, οι φορείς εφαρμογής που είναι οργανισμοί δημόσιου δικαίου ή ιδιωτικές οντότητες που παρέχουν δημόσιες υπηρεσίες και οι φορείς εφαρμογής συστημάτων ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου που αναφέρονται στο παράρτημα ΙΙΙ σημείο 5 στοιχεία β) και γ) διενεργούν εκτίμηση των επιπτώσεων που μπορεί να έχει στα θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα η χρήση του συστήματος. Για τον σκοπό αυτόν, οι φορείς εφαρμογής διενεργούν εκτίμηση που περιλαμβάνει:

α) περιγραφή των διαδικασιών του φορέα εφαρμογής στις οποίες το σύστημα ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου θα χρησιμοποιείται σύμφωνα με τον επιδιωκόμενο σκοπό του·

β) περιγραφή του χρονικού διαστήματος εντός του οποίου και της συχνότητας με την οποία προορίζεται να χρησιμοποιηθεί κάθε σύστημα ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου·

γ) τις κατηγορίες φυσικών προσώπων και ομάδων που είναι πιθανό να επηρεαστούν από τη χρήση του στο συγκεκριμένο πλαίσιο·

δ) τους συγκεκριμένους κινδύνους βλάβης που είναι πιθανό να επηρεάσουν τις κατηγορίες φυσικών προσώπων ή ομάδων προσώπων που προσδιορίζονται δυνάμει του στοιχείου γ) της παρούσας παραγράφου, λαμβανομένων υπόψη των πληροφοριών που δίνει ο πάροχος δυνάμει του άρθρου 13·

ε) περιγραφή της εφαρμογής των μέτρων ανθρώπινης εποπτείας, σύμφωνα με τις οδηγίες χρήσης·

στ) τα μέτρα που πρέπει να λαμβάνονται σε περίπτωση επέλευσης των εν λόγω κινδύνων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των ρυθμίσεων για την εσωτερική διακυβέρνηση και τους μηχανισμούς υποβολής καταγγελιών.

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# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

## GDPR

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# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

## GDPR

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## DPIA

**(Data Protection Impact Assessment)**

*Άρθρο 35*

**Εκτίμηση αντικτύπου σχετικά με την προστασία δεδομένων**

1. Όταν ένα είδος επεξεργασίας, ιδίως με χρήση νέων τεχνολογιών και συνεκτιμώντας τη φύση, το πεδίο εφαρμογής, το πλαίσιο και τους σκοπούς της επεξεργασίας, ενδέχεται να επιφέρει υψηλό κίνδυνο για τα δικαιώματα και τις ελευθερίες των φυσικών προσώπων, ο υπεύθυνος επεξεργασίας διενεργεί, πριν από την επεξεργασία, εκτίμηση των επιπτώσεων των σχεδιαζόμενων πράξεων επεξεργασίας στην προστασία δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα. Σε μία εκτίμηση μπορεί να εξετάζεται ένα σύνολο παρόμοιων πράξεων επεξεργασίας οι οποίες ενέχουν παρόμοιους υψηλούς κινδύνους.

2. Ο υπεύθυνος επεξεργασίας ζητεί τη γνώμη του υπευθύνου προστασίας δεδομένων, εφόσον έχει οριστεί, κατά τη διενέργεια εκτίμησης αντικτύπου σχετικά με την προστασία δεδομένων.

3. Η αναφερόμενη στην παράγραφο 1 εκτίμηση αντικτύπου σχετικά με την προστασία δεδομένων απαιτείται ιδίως στην περίπτωση:

α) συστηματικής και εκτενούς αξιολόγησης προσωπικών πτυχών σχετικά με φυσικά πρόσωπα, η οποία βασίζεται σε αυτοματοποιημένη επεξεργασία, περιλαμβανομένης της κατάρτισης προφίλ, και στην οποία βασίζονται αποφάσεις που παράγουν έννομα αποτελέσματα σχετικά με το φυσικό πρόσωπο ή ομοίως επηρεάζουν σημαντικά το φυσικό πρόσωπο,

β) μεγάλης κλίμακας επεξεργασίας των ειδικών κατηγοριών δεδομένων που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 9 παράγραφος 1 ή δεδομένων προσωπικού χαρακτήρα που αφορούν ποινικές καταδίκες και αδικήματα που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο 10 ή

γ) συστηματικής παρακολούθησης δημοσίως προσβάσιμου χώρου σε μεγάλη κλίμακα.

## AI Act

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## FRIA

**(Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment)**

*Άρθρο 27*

**Εκτίμηση επιπτώσεων των συστημάτων ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου στα θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα**

1. Πριν από την ανάπτυξη συστήματος ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου που αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 6 παράγραφος 2, με την εξαίρεση συστημάτων ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου που προορίζονται για χρήση στον τομέα που αναφέρεται στο παράρτημα ΙΙΙ σημείο 2, οι φορείς εφαρμογής που είναι οργανισμοί δημόσιου δικαίου ή ιδιωτικές οντότητες που παρέχουν δημόσιες υπηρεσίες και οι φορείς εφαρμογής συστημάτων ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου που αναφέρονται στο παράρτημα ΙΙΙ σημείο 5 στοιχεία β) και γ) διενεργούν εκτίμηση των επιπτώσεων που μπορεί να έχει στα θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα η χρήση του συστήματος. Για τον σκοπό αυτόν, οι φορείς εφαρμογής διενεργούν εκτίμηση που περιλαμβάνει:

α) περιγραφή των διαδικασιών του φορέα εφαρμογής στις οποίες το σύστημα ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου θα χρησιμοποιείται σύμφωνα με τον επιδιωκόμενο σκοπό του·

β) περιγραφή του χρονικού διαστήματος εντός του οποίου και της συχνότητας με την οποία προορίζεται να χρησιμοποιηθεί κάθε σύστημα ΤΝ υψηλού κινδύνου·

γ) τις κατηγορίες φυσικών προσώπων και ομάδων που είναι πιθανό να επηρεαστούν από τη χρήση του στο συγκεκριμένο πλαίσιο·

δ) τους συγκεκριμένους κινδύνους βλάβης που είναι πιθανό να επηρεάσουν τις κατηγορίες φυσικών προσώπων ή ομάδων προσώπων που προσδιορίζονται δυνάμει του στοιχείου γ) της παρούσας παραγράφου, λαμβανομένων υπόψη των πληροφοριών που δίνει ο πάροχος δυνάμει του άρθρου 13·

ε) περιγραφή της εφαρμογής των μέτρων ανθρώπινης εποπτείας, σύμφωνα με τις οδηγίες χρήσης·

στ) τα μέτρα που πρέπει να λαμβάνονται σε περίπτωση επέλευσης των εν λόγω κινδύνων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των ρυθμίσεων για την εσωτερική διακυβέρνηση και τους μηχανισμούς υποβολής καταγγελιών.

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# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

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


## EDPB DPIA Template

Start Date: **14 April 2026**

End Date: **09 June 2026**

Public consultation reference: **DPIA Template**

Public consultation ongoing

The EDPB DPIA template is subject to a public consultation. After the public consultation is finished, the template will be finalised (subject to any appropriate modifications), after which all data protection authorities will begin the necessary steps to adopt this template as their unique template or as a 'meta-template' with which national specific templates will be compatible. In the meantime, organisations are encouraged to use this template and to provide feedback in the context of the public consultation.

https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/documents/public-consultations/2026/edpb-dpia-template_en

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


## Template [2026] for Data Protection Impact Assessment ('DPIA')

### Explainer

Version 1.0

Adopted on 10 March 2026

https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2026-04/edpb_dpia_template_explainer_2026_v1_en.pdf

GDPR: DPIA

## Table of Contents



https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2026-04/edpb_dpia_template_explainer_2026_v1_en.pdf

# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

**GDPR: DPIA**



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# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

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## 2.1 Lawfulness of the processing

### 2.1.1 Legal basis

22 Analyse the legal basis of the processing. The analysis of each legal basis should be carried out in relation to each of the purposes of the processing (1.1.2) including secondary or compatible purposes (1.1.3).

23 If applicable, refer to an existing analysis (documented elsewhere, not in this template) or analyse the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party and conduct a balancing test[4]. If this analysis relies on any hypothesis on the implemented measures, residual risks, etc. please ensure they are properly reported in the appropriate sections in this template.

### 2.1.2 Reasons to lift the processing prohibition

24 If special categories of data are processed (see 1.1.1Processed personal data), the reasons that led to the lifting of the prohibition on processing special categories of data must be properly identified and justified.

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# Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη

GDPR: DPIA

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## 3.1 Impacts of the processing on the rights and freedoms of the data subjects

32 Explain how the threats that the planned processing (as it has been designed and is projected to be implemented, including technical, legal/contractual and organisational measures to mitigate risk) poses to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects can be materialised and identify their impacts and all possible risk sources. These are risks that exist even if everything works exactly as designed and all actors follow the rules.
These threats flow, mainly, from the processed personal data (1.1.1), the very purpose of the processing (1.1.2) and its nature, scope and context (1.1.4). Even if the processing is correctly implemented and works as specified, there are risks tied to its inherent and structural characteristics: everything goes as intended, but design choices themselves create risks for data subjects' rights and freedoms, even where there is no failure or attack.
A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact data subject's rights and freedoms (for example, linking, identifying, inaccuracy or data disclosure) and it may cause physical, material or non-material damage to data subjects.
A risk source is the origin or underlying cause from which a threat can materialise. Typical examples are the characteristics of the processing itself i.e., its purpose, wrong design and weaknesses (for example, use of unique identifiers, or long retention periods), exposures, etc.
Impact is the consequences that can be expected from the threat materialisation, always considering data subject's rights and freedoms (see recital 75 GDPR, for example).

## 3.2 Assess the necessity of the processing

33 Assess the necessity of the processing[6]. Evaluate if the envisaged processing is effective and the least intrusive for the data subject's rights and freedoms. Analyse if the processing demonstrably works as intended, at least to the appropriate or required level. Provide evidence (for example, concerning the different considered alternatives and their effectiveness in achieving the purpose) and justification.

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


and could not make claims against any jurisdiction other than Portugal, and although the case against Switzerland only partially succeeded (the association was found to have a case, but not the individuals), the general feeling is that these cases have paved the way for more climate change cases in the future based on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

The Council of Europe is considering a further instrument to make the right to a healthy environment an incontestable part of the ECHR, and has produced a **document** with background and arguments.

The 2024 case with the most human interest was ***Dian v. Denmark*** (44002/22), concerning a Romanian national of 61, who was found guilty of begging on a pedestrian street in Copenhagen and also of insulting a police inspector in the exercise of her functions. He was sentenced to 20 days' imprisonment, since he had a previous conviction for begging. He called in aid a previous ECtHR decision which found that a sentence for begging could be a breach of Article 8 (respect for private life). But the court said that there was no absolute right to beg, and that each case depended on its circumstances. In this case, he had other sources of income, roughly €135 in his pocket, and a house back in Romania. His case failed.

https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/commentary-and-opinion/what-did-the-european-court-of-human-rights-do-in-2024/5122006.article

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


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


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## UK to decriminalize rough sleeping

Lara Zand | BPP U. Law School, GB

JUNE 12, 2025 07:04:06 PM

https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/06/uk-to-decriminalize-rough-sleeping/

## UK to decriminalize rough sleeping

**Lara Zand | BPP U. Law School, GB**

JUNE 12, 2025 07:04:06 PM

The UK government announced on Monday that it plans to scrap a Georgian-era law that made "rough sleeping" a criminal offense.

The official **statement** promised to abolish the 200-year-old statute by spring of next year.

"We are drawing a line under nearly two centuries of injustice towards some of the most vulnerable in society," Deputy Prime Minister and Housing Secretary Angela Rayner said. "No one should ever be criminalised simply for sleeping rough and by scrapping this cruel and outdated law, we are making sure that can never happen again."

The Vagrancy Act was introduced in 1824 in response to rising homelessness rates in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and Industrial Revolution. Under the act, convictions for rough sleeping—sleeping in the street—or begging can attract fines of up to £1,000 and occasionally imprisonment.

The UK Parliament voted to repeal the act in April 2022, but enacting the repeal was delayed until the government brought in replacement legislation and the law continued in force. Single Homeless Project, a UK charity, **reported** that between April 2022 and June 2024, 177 people were arrested under the law.

The Minister for Homelessness Rushanara Ali agreed that the act was "neither just nor fit for purpose" and said government efforts going forwards would focus on the root causes of homelessness.

The government has pledged to introduce new offenses of facilitating begging for gain and trespassing with the intention of committing a crime, which aim to crack down on organized begging facilitated by criminal gangs. It also committed to increasing funding for homelessness services by an additional £233 million this financial year.




TECH

# Update: Head of Romania's telecommunications regulatory authority calls for immediate suspension of TikTok amid electoral scandal



https://www.romania-insider.com/head-ancom-calls-immediate-suspension-tiktok-romania-elections-2024

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By Anna Robinson • Feb. 10, 2025 1:00 pm EST

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# More than 500 arrested at protest against Palestine Action ban in London

LONDON | METROPOLITAN POLICE | Sunday 12 April 2026 at 11:59am

https://www.itv.com/news/london/2026-04-11/almost-100-people-arrested-at-protest-against-palestine-action-ban-in-london




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# Ευχαριστώ!!!

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